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Abstract 
The global financial crisis underscored the importance of regulation and supervision to a well-
functioning banking system that efficiently channels financial resources into investment. In this 
paper, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate by assessing whether compliance with 
international regulatory standards and protocols enhances bank operating efficiency. We focus 
specifically on the adoption of international capital standards and the Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Bank Supervision (BCP). The relationship between bank efficiency and regulatory 
compliance is investigated using the Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrapping approach 
on an international sample of publicly listed banks. Our results indicate that overall BCP 
compliance, or indeed compliance with any of its individual chapters, has no association with 
bank efficiency.  
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 1 INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we assess whether compliance with international regulatory standards and 
protocols affects bank performance. We focus on the adoption of international capital standards 
and the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP). These principles, issued in 
1997 by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, have since become the global standards for 
bank regulation, widely adopted by regulators in developed and developing countries. The 
severity of the 2007–09 financial crisis has cast doubt on the effectiveness of these global 
standards to foster bank stability and regulatory reforms are under way in several countries. The 
initial crisis-induced assessment of regulatory failure is now giving way to a more complex 
regulatory dialogue and detailed evaluation of the principles underlying international regulatory 
standards as well as the implications of their adoption, in terms of banks' safety and soundness. 
In addition, the burden of compliance with international regulatory standards is becoming 
increasingly onerous, and financial institutions worldwide are developing compliance 
frameworks to enable management to meet more stringent regulatory standards. As regulators 
refine and improve their approach and methodologies, banks must respond to more stringent 
compliance requirements. This has implications for risk management and resource allocation, 
and, ultimately, on bank performance.1 
The goal of this paper is to advance the existing literature by examining the relationship 
between the observance of international regulatory standards and the performance the banking 
sector. To evaluate bank performance we follow a structural approach, which relies on a model 
of the banking firm and a concept of optimization (Hughes and Mester, 2014). The traditional 
structural approach relies on the economics of cost minimization or profit maximization; bank 
technical or operating (in)efficiency is broadly defined as the distance between an actual 
production process and the "best practice" or the optimal standard.2  
From a theoretical perspective, scholars’ predictions as to the effects of regulation and 
supervision on bank performance are conflicting. Given the unresolved conflicting theoretical 
views on regulation and, hence, on supervision, in the aftermath of the 2007–09 financial crisis, 
at a time when significant regulatory reforms are under way, it is important to shed more light on 
                                                 
1
 By the end of 2014, Citigroup had nearly 30,000 employees working on regulatory and compliance issues (an 
increase of 33 percent since 2011). This trend is compounded by the fact that compliance staffing is increasing at a 
time when the bank has been shrinking assets and staff (The Tell, Wall Street Journal, July 2014). Similarly, 
JPMorgan Chase expanded its risk control staff by 30 percent since 2011. In Europe, Deutsche Bank is doubling its 
compliance spending and adding at least 500 additional resources (Bloomberg, 9 July 2014). In 2013, HSBC 
announced plans to add approximately 3,000 compliance staff. This would bring its total compliance staff to more 
than 5,000, almost 2 percent of its global workforce, which has shrunk by over 40,000 in the past two years. (The 
Times, 25 September 2013). 
2
 Traditionally, structural approaches to the evaluation of bank performance have assumed that all banks are equally 
efficient at either minimizing costs or maximizing profits, subject to a random error (ε i), which is assumed to be 
normally distributed. Alternatively, structural approaches rely on the estimation of a frontier to capture the best 
practice, and estimate inefficiency as the difference between the best practice performance and the actual 
performance. In this study we follow the latter. There are four main methodologies for estimating the frontier: 
stochastic frontier; the distribution-free approach; the thick frontier and data envelopment analysis (see Hughes and 
Mester (2014) for a detailed discussion of the relative merits of the different methodologies). 
 the effects of the existing approach to regulation in general and, ultimately, to propose policy 
avenues for improvements. Despite the fact that bank regulation and supervision have been a key 
focus of the post-crisis regulatory debate, there is no evidence that any common set of best 
practices is universally appropriate for promoting well-functioning banks. As a consequence, the 
question of how regulation affects bank performance remains unanswered. Regulators around the 
world are still grappling with the issue of what constitutes good regulation and which regulatory 
reforms they should undertake. 
In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate by assessing whether 
compliance with international regulatory standards and protocols on supervision enhances banks’ 
operating efficiency. We focus on regulatory compliance, because it can affect bank performance 
through several channels: (a) lending decisions; (b) asset allocation decisions; (c) funding 
decisions. Regulatory compliance is costly. Ultimately, these costs are borne not by regulators or 
banks, but by bank customers, in terms of lower saving rates and higher lending rates. This, in 
turn, may lead to an inefficient allocation of resources in the economy. As Haldane (2013) 
indicates, if systemic stability can be achieved in other ways, these are deadweight costs to 
society.  
On the regulators’ side, excessive reliance on systematic adherence to a checklist of 
regulations and supervisory practices might hamper regulators’ monitoring efforts and prevent a 
deeper understanding of banks’ risk-taking. More specifically, to shed some light on the 
aforementioned issues, we aim to answer the following questions: (i) Does compliance with 
international regulatory standards affect bank operating efficiency? (ii) By what mechanisms 
does regulatory compliance affect bank performance? (iii) To what extent do bank-specific and 
country-specific characteristics soften or amplify the impact of regulatory compliance on bank 
performance? (iv) Does the impact of regulatory compliance increase with level of development? 
Building on the IMF and the World Bank Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank 
Supervision (BCP) assessments conducted from 1999 to 2014, we evaluate how compliance with 
BCP affects bank performance for a sample of 1,146 publicly listed banks drawn from a broad 
cross-section of countries. We focus on publicly listed banks, on the assumption that these 
institutions are subject to more stringent regulatory controls and compliance requirements. This 
focus should also enhance cross-country comparability because these banks share internationally 
adopted accounting standards. Furthermore, we categorize the sample countries by both 
economic development and geographic region. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(2011), to assess the level of bank compliance we use an aggregate BCP compliance score and a 
disaggregated approach, to differentiate among various dimensions of regulation and 
supervision. To measure bank performance we begin with the estimation of a common global 
frontier by means of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a widely used nonparametric 
methodology. Unlike previous studies, we explicitly account for cross-country heterogeneity in 
bank efficiency analysis, by adopting a two-stage double bootstrapping procedure: the first stage 
produces (bias-corrected) efficiency estimates which are then used in the second-stage truncated 
regressions to infer how various (bank-specific and country-specific) factors influence the (bias-
corrected) estimated efficiency (Simar and Wilson, 2007). Earlier studies suggest that the impact 
of regulation and supervision increases with the level of development (Barth et al., 2004; 
 Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008). To assess whether regulatory compliance affects banks differently 
in countries at different levels of development, we re-run the estimations focusing on a 
subsample of emerging markets. 
Our results indicate that overall BCP compliance—or indeed compliance with any of the 
individual chapters—has no association with bank operating efficiency. This result holds after 
controlling for bank-specific characteristics, the macroeconomic environment, institutional 
quality, and the existing regulatory framework. It adds further evidence to the argument that 
compliance per se has little effect on bank efficiency. Conditional on being a good bank (that is, 
a bank complying international regulatory and supervisory standards) regulation has no impact 
on bank performance. Nevertheless, increasing regulatory constraints may prevent banks from 
efficient allocation of resources. When only banks in emerging and developing countries are 
considered, a relationship is revealed. The extent of ongoing supervision is negatively associated 
with input efficiency. On the other hand, the extent to which supervisors apply international 
global standards is positively associated with bank input efficiency. This difference indicates that 
in emerging markets, adherence to international standards of best practice may have a positive 
effect on bank performance. However, these results need to be treated with caution, because they 
may also reflect the inability of assessors to provide a consistent cross-country evaluation of 
effective banking regulation. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology; Section 4 contains the 
results, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Financial regulation and supervision are considered key to financial stability as a well 
functioning regulatory and supervisory framework can help minimize moral hazard and 
discourage excessive risk-taking. Post crisis, questions were raised about the appropriateness of 
the existing regulatory setting, with a number of studies indicating weaknesses in regulation and 
supervision as one of the key causes of the severity of the crisis (Cihak et al, 2013; Merrouche 
and Nier 2014). While efforts to strengthen regulation and supervision are well under way in 
many countries, there is no evidence that any common set of rules is universally appropriate for 
promoting well performing and safe banks. Regulatory structures that will succeed in some 
countries may not constitute best practice in other countries that have different institutional 
settings. As pointed out by Barth et al, (2013), there is no broad cross-country evidence as to 
which of the many different regulations and supervisory practices employed around the world 
work best to promote financial stability. Regulators are still grappling with the question of what 
constitutes good regulation and which regulatory reforms they should undertake. A recent review 
of the FSAP program (IMF, 2014) includes an extensive study on standard supervisory 
assessments and analyzes the link between standard assessments and financial performance 
measures. They conclude that while there is no perfect supervisory approach, the lack of certain 
key features in a supervisory approach is likely to lead to macro-financial consequences. 
 From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between regulation and supervision and 
bank performance is not straightforward. The greater part of earlier policy literature on financial 
regulation has been inspired by the broader debate on the role of government in the economy. 
The two best-known opposing camps in this field are the public interest and the private interest 
defenders, who both, nonetheless, agree on the assumption of market failure (Barth et al, 2006). 
For the public interest camp, governments regulate banks to ensure better functioning and thus 
more efficient banks, ultimately for the benefit of the economy and the society (Feldstein, 1972). 
According to the public interest view, which largely dominated thinking during the 20th century, 
regulators have sufficient information and enforcement powers to promote the public interest. In 
this setting, well-conceived regulation can exert a positive effect on firm behavior by fostering 
competition and encouraging effective governance in the sector. In contrast, according to the 
private interest view, efficiency may be distorted because firms are constrained as to where they 
channel resources. These complex interactions may have conflicting effects on the efficiency of 
the banking system. 
The empirical literature investigating the impact of financial regulation has mainly 
focused on the impact on bank performance and risk taking, with mixed outcomes. A number of 
studies employ the World Bank surveys on bank regulations and supervision to construct 
measures of bank regulation and supervision.3 In general, these studies find that regulations that 
empower private sector monitoring have a positive impact on bank performance. One of the 
earlier studies is by Barth et al. (2004), who report that policies that promote accurate 
information disclosure and provide incentives for private sector’ corporate control work best to 
promote bank development, performance and financial sector stability. 
Using information from the abovementioned World Bank database, Agoraki et al, (2011) 
construct indices to proxy capital requirements, official supervisory power and restrictions on 
bank activities and find that these regulations reduce banking risk, but suggest that the overall 
effect depends on banks’ market power.  Klomp and DeHaan (2012) on the other hand, find that 
the impact of bank regulation and supervision on banking risk is not uniform, with the most 
significant effect on riskier banks.  
A number of studies have focused on the relationship between regulation and supervision 
and bank efficiency (Fries and Taci 2005; Grigorian and Manole 2006; Pasiouras et al, 2009; 
Chortareas et al, 2012). Overall, their results corroborate the role of market discipline and of 
supervisory power in increasing both profit and cost efficiency, although the evidence on capital 
regulation remains mixed. A recent study by Barth et al, (2013) examine whether bank 
regulation, supervision and monitoring enhance or hinder bank efficiency and highlight potential 
trade-offs between bank safety and soundness and bank efficiency. 
One key shortcoming of this literature is that it attempts to assess the quality of bank 
regulation and supervision by using proxies of supervisory authorities’ attributes, such as 
independence and scope of powers. Survey information only reflects whether laws or regulations 
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 Barth et al., (2001, 2006, 2008, 2012) 
 are on the books, but not to what extent they are implemented in practice.4 Only a handful of 
papers use an alternative to the World Bank survey data and employ an index measuring the 
extent to which countries adhere to the Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision as issued 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCPs). The Core Principles summarize best 
practice and have been endorsed by most countries in the world, effectively resulting in an 
almost universal standard for banking regulators (Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2008). Since 1999, the 
IMF and the World Bank have conducted evaluations of member countries’ compliance with 
these standards and therefore these assessments provide a unique source of information about the 
quality of supervision and regulation around the world.  
The earlier studies using BCPs data (Sundararajan et al, 2001; Podpiera, 2004; Das et al, 
2005) do not find evidence to support the hypothesis that better compliance leads to a sounder 
banking system. Demirgüç-Kunt et al (2008) rely on compliance with the BCP to investigate 
whether better banking supervision and regulation is associated with sounder banks. They proxy 
bank soundness with Moody’s financial strength ratings and find that banks receive higher 
ratings in countries with higher compliance scores related to information provision. On the other 
hand, compliance with the other Core Principles does not affect bank ratings. More recently,  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) extend the set of countries used in the empirical analysis 
and find that BCP compliance is not robustly associated with bank soundness, proxied by a 
system-wide z-score. 
Our study builds on this literature and evaluates how compliance with BCP affects bank 
performance for a large sample publicly listed banks drawn from a broad cross-section of 
countries. This is the first study to comprehensively analyze whether BCP compliance is 
associated with bank operating efficiency. While regulatory compliance might foster bank 
stability, it may also interfere with the efficient operation of banks. In addition, a higher 
regulatory burden may create incentives for banks to engage in riskier activities and regulatory 
arbitrage. This could affect negatively bank performance and ultimately affect financial stability. 
Thus, we believe our work improves upon existing studies by using a more comprehensive 
measure of bank performance. In addition, our data sample includes all IMF and World Bank 
assessments, from their initial ones in 1999 up to 2014. This enables us to include countries that 
have been assessed twice (in some cases even three times) therefore minimizing the bias 
potentially introduced by assessors’ experience, personal views, cultural and regulatory 
differences and existing macroeconomic conditions. 
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 Cihak and Tieman (2008) compare the World Bank survey data and the BCP assessments and find that the 
correlation is low, therefore concluding that compliance in most countries is different from on-the-books regulation. 
Of course, assessing regulatory compliance is not an exact science and individual assessment might be influenced by 
many factors, including the assessors’ experience and the existing regulatory framework (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2011).  
 3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 The Sample 
The dataset used in this study comprises bank-level data and country-level data; it is 
compiled from a number of sources: (a) the IMF and World Bank Basel Core Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) database, which includes detailed assessment of a country’s 
compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP) during 1999–
2010; (b) the Barth et al, (2004, 2006, 2008 and 2012) surveys on bank regulation, supervision, 
and monitoring; (c) the World Bank Economic Indicators database (WDI); and (d) the 
Bankscope database provided by Bureau van Dijk and Fitch Ratings.  
Bank-level information comprises balance sheet and income statement data for all 
publicly quoted commercial banks and bank holding companies. We focus on publicly quoted 
banks, on the assumption that these institutions are subject to more stringent regulatory controls 
and need to comply with international regulations, such as capital regulation. This focus should 
also enhance cross-country comparability, not least because publicly quoted banks follow 
international accounting standards to report end-of-year accounting variables (Laeven and 
Levine, 2009). When constructing the dataset, we exclude banks with missing information on 
relevant accounting variables (total assets, loans, other earning assets, deposits, equity capital, 
interest and non-interest income, and interest and non-interest expenses). To prevent the 
possibility of outliers driving the results, we following a two-step procedure; first, we winsorize 
the input and output variables at the 1% level.5 In a second step, we apply data cloud methods to 
identify and remove outliers in terms of the input/output mix
 
(see Section 3.4 for more detail on 
input and output specification).
 6 
 
We then match the bank-level information with country-level information to investigate 
the link between regulatory compliance and bank performance, accounting for cross-country 
differences in macroeconomic and institutional factors. Our final cross-sectional sample includes 
1,146 banks across 75 countries over the period 1999–2014 (Table A.1).7 Our sample includes 
countries with vastly different banking systems and economic conditions, with some countries 
only represented by a few listed banks, while others have a much higher sample share. 
Specifically, U.S. banks account for approximately 25 percent (296 banks) of the sample. To 
ensure that our findings are not overly influenced by U.S. banks, we examine results with and 
without them. 
For the purpose of the analysis, we categorize the 75 countries in our sample both in 
terms of both economic development and geographic region, combining information from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
                                                 
5
 For robustness, this procedure was repeated at the 5% and 10% levels and the results are qualitatively similar. 
6
 This method allows for the identification of “influential observations” in the application of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (see Wilson, 1995). 
7
 The original BCP assessment exercise examines 158 countries, principalities, and monetary unions; but because of 
data availability and the incomplete overlap among the four databases, the dataset’s global span is reduced to 75 
countries. 
 (EBRD). Countries are classified into four categories of economic development: (i) Major 
Advanced (countries in the G7 group); (ii) Advanced, (iii) Emerging and Developing; and (iv) 
Transitional. In addition, countries are also classified into 11 geographical regions (see Section 
3.6 for more details)  
Because the country-level regulatory data (data source (b)) are collected in four survey 
exercises (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011), following Barth et al. (2013) we match the data for the 
regulatory variables as follows: the 1999 survey data are used for period 1999–2002; the 2003 
survey data are used for period 2003–2006, 2007 survey data are used for period 2007-2010, and 
the 2011 survey data used for the period 2011-2014.   
 
3.2 Empirical Set-Up and Definition of Variables 
Frontier methodologies for the analysis of firm performance have generated a large 
literature since the seminal work of Leibenstein (1966) introduced the concept of x-inefficiency 
as the gap between ideal efficiency and actual efficiency. Frontier approaches measure firm 
performance relative to ‘best practice’ in the industry. Such measures summarize performance in 
a single statistic that controls for differences among firms using a sophisticated multidimensional 
framework (Banker et al, 2010). The evaluation of efficiency is based on the assumption that the 
production frontier of the fully efficient organization is known. In practice, data is used to 
estimate this idealized frontier. Over the last half-century, estimations of this best practice 
frontier developed along two empirical paths: a parametric and a non-parametric one. In this 
study, we follow a non-parametric approach that uses linear programming methods to assign 
each observation to its own set of ‘coefficients’ from which inefficient behavior can be assessed. 
More specifically, we employ the most well known of these `data-oriented’ methods, Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), first introduced by (Charnes et al, 1978) and later extended by 
(Banker et al, 1984). Our methodological approach represents an extension of the traditional 
DEA model. 
Formally, DEA is a methodology directed to frontiers rather than central tendencies. It 
floats a piecewise linear surface to rest on top of the observations rather than fitting a regression 
plane through the `middle’ of the data using statistical methods (Cooper et al, 2011). DEA 
produces exact in-sample estimates of efficiency; that is a measure of the performance of an 
institution relative to the other institutions that are producing the same good or service. This 
method is non-stochastic; it assumes that all deviations from the frontier are the result of 
inefficiency. This represents a drawback of the approach, as statistical inference about estimates 
comparisons are precluded without further simulation techniques such as bootstrapping. To 
overcome this problem, we follow a double bootstrapping procedure, as proposed by Simar and 
Wilson (2007). 
Another of the key issues that arises in the use of frontier methods for cross-country 
comparisons of bank efficiency is the existence of significant heterogeneity. Several studies have 
proposed alternative methodologies to overcome this problem. In this paper, we begin with the 
estimation of a common global frontier by means of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In the 
next step, to account for cross-country heterogeneity we adopt a form of the two-stage approach 
with a double bootstrapping procedure (Simar and Wilson, 2007). In this two-stage approach, the 
 first stage measures efficiency by a DEA estimator and the second stage uses truncated 
regression to infer how various (bank-specific and country-specific) factors influence the (bias-
corrected) estimated efficiency. The choice of this methodological approach is driven by the 
characteristics of our sample, which includes a large number of countries (and a relatively small 
number of banks per country) and therefore presents considerable challenges to accounting for 
differences in operating, regulatory, and macroeconomic conditions experienced by banks.8 Our 
study is the first cross-country study to apply the double bootstrapping two-stage procedure in a 
consistent manner.9  
In more detail, our approach can be broken up into three steps. In the first step, we use a 
nonparametric input-oriented DEA model to measure bank efficiency.10 However, ignoring the 
complex and heterogeneous nature of the sample and simply benchmarking performance on the 
basis of a global common frontier would yield biased efficiency estimates. As a consequence, in 
the next stage, we apply the double bootstrapping procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson 
(2007) to explicitly account for the complex serial correlation in a two-stage DEA efficiency 
estimation. 11 In the estimation of DEA technical efficiency scores, this procedure recognizes that 
certain bank-specific and environmental variables influence the estimate of the true unobserved 
efficiency score and is thus consistent with the second-stage truncated regression analysis (Glass 
et al, 2010).  
In a second step, the results from a truncated regression of the initial DEA efficiency 
estimates on a set of environmental variables are used in a nonparametric bootstrap to generate 
biased corrected efficiency estimates.  This step adjusts for the influence on the DEA efficiency 
estimations of the correlation between observable bank/country level factors and the 
inputs/outputs in a bank production process. Finally, in a third step, the bias-corrected DEA 
efficiency estimates from step two are used as the dependent variable in a further truncated 
regression on the same set of environmental variables, and a parametric bootstrap is used to 
                                                 
8
 An alternative methodology that is popular in cross-country studies is the meta-frontier approach (Battese et al., 
2004), which allows for the estimation of technology gap ratios between individual country frontiers and the overall 
meta-frontier, which is derived as an envelopment of individual frontiers. For applications of the meta-frontier 
approach is banking, see, among others Bos and Schmeidel (2007) and Casu et al. (2013). Because our study is 
limited to publicly listed companies, it does not include a sufficiently large number of observations per country to 
allow the estimation of individual country frontiers as well as a meta-frontier. 
9
 Some previous studies (Brissimis et al.. 2008; Delis and Papanikolaou 2009) have applied the bootstrapping 
procedure (more specifically, they have applied algorithm 1 from Simar and Wilson (2007) which improves 
inference but does not take into account the bias as detailed in equation (4)). Barth et al.. (2013) use the procedure as 
a robustness test without indication of the extent of its use.  
10
As a further robustness test, the original (raw) DEA estimates were used to create a subsample that excluded banks 
on the frontier (=1).  This subsample was then used to re-estimate efficiency.  The correlation between efficiency 
results of this reduced subsample was found to be statistically similar (a Pearson and Spearman rank correlation 
coefficient were significant at the 1 percent level) to the original estimates, a good indication that outliers haven’t 
affected the results to a large extent (Casu and Molyneux, 2003).  
11
 Specifically we employ Algorithm 2 in Simar and Wilson (2007), which corrects for (i) bias in DEA estimates, (ii) 
serial dependence among DEA estimates (of unknown structure), and (iii) the DEA-related artefact of placing 
probability mass at 1 for some observations.  
 provide more efficient estimates of the statistical relationships between the environmental 
variables and bank efficiency.  
3.3  Estimating Bank Efficiency 
We proceed to evaluate banks’ operating efficiency as follows. Let us define a production set as 
 
   {(   )                } (1) 
 
where     
 
 denotes a vector of p inputs and     
 
 denotes a vector of q outputs.  The 
technology or production frontier is defined as 
 
    {(   ) (   )    (    )           } (2) 
 
which is then used to measure the i
th
 banks’ input technical efficiency, defined as 
 
       (     )     {     (      )   
 } (3) 
 
the proportion by which input quantities can be reduced without reducing output quantities 
(Coelli et al, 2005). 12 
 
When a large cross-country sample is used to build a best-practice frontier, inefficiency 
for bank i in country j is measured in terms of distance from this global common frontier. This 
implies that any cross-country differences in the initial DEA efficiency scores are entirely 
attributed to bank-level managerial decisions regarding the scale and mix of inputs. If this 
assumption is not correct, it will result in biased efficiency estimates. In the next two steps, 
unlike most cross-country bank efficiency studies, we apply a double bootstrapping procedure 
(Simar and Wilson, 2007) to account explicitly for the complex serial correlation in a two-stage 
DEA efficiency study. This procedure will adjust for the bias in the first stage DEA estimates of 
bank efficiency. We will then use these bias-corrected efficiency scores to improve statistical 
efficiency in the second-stage truncated regression estimates.  
 
Mathematically this bias can be described as follows:  
 
      ̂      (  ̂)     (4) 
 
where    is the true (unobservable) efficiency score for i
th
 bank,   ̂ is the nonparametric DEA 
estimate of    ,     (  ̂) is the bias of the nonparametric estimate which is strictly negative in 
finite samples, and    is the error in the nonparametric estimate, which will disappear 
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 We report efficiency scores based on a variable returns to scale (VRS) assumptions.    
 asymptotically.13 As can be seen from (4) the true unobserved efficiency scores are generally 
downward biased, and nonparametric efficiency estimates that ignore this bias will provide a 
more favorable estimate of efficiency. In the context of our study, the bank would appear to be 
performing better, in terms of the efficient allocation of its resources, than is actually the case. 
Our estimation will implicitly account for this bias.  
3.4  Definition of Inputs and Outputs  
The inputs and outputs used to estimate efficiency are defined based on an extension of 
the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977), which does not penalize nontraditional 
banking activity and takes into account a bank’s ability to manage risk. We estimate a model that 
has three inputs and three outputs.   
The inputs are: (i) customer deposits and short-term funding; (ii) total costs (defined as 
the sum of interest expenses and noninterest expenses), and (iii) equity capital to adequately 
account for the impact of risk (Berger, 2007). Hughes and Mester (2010) argue that the 
inappropriate treatment of equity capital can bias bank efficiency estimates because banks can 
use either capital or deposits to fund loans, and this choice has a direct effect on funding costs.14 
As equity capital has a minimum level due to capital adequacy regulation, it should be treated as 
a quasi-fixed input; a variable whose control is not at the complete discretion of the 
management.15 
The three outputs are: (i) loans; (ii) other earning assets; and (iii) noninterest income as a 
proxy for off-balance-sheet activities.
16
 We include the latter output to ensure that we do not 
penalize banks that have a substantial share of nontraditional activities (Barth et al, 2013)  
 
3.5  Measuring Bank Compliance 
The principal variable of interest, BCP compliance, is derived from the IMF and World Bank 
Basel Core Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) database.17 Our study extends the work 
of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) by using assessment data covering 1999–2010, which 
includes a U.S. banking sector assessment. 18 The Basel Core FSAP is an exhaustive global 
exercise, capturing the compliance features of banking industries in both developed and 
developing economies. The 25 BCP core principles are considered by regulators and by 
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 This is equation 16 in Simar and Wilson (2007). 
14
 Hughes and Mester (2010) argue that most bank efficiency studies make use of financial statement data and define 
costs based on an accounting cash-flow concept rather than economic principles, the former using interest paid on 
debt (deposits) and not the cost of equity. This would mean that if a bank chooses to substitute some of its equity 
capital for debt its cash-flow costs will rise, making the less-capitalized bank appear more costly than the well-
capitalized bank.   
15
 In an input-oriented model we would thus treat equity as a negative output, (Bogeoft and Otto, 2011). 
16
 Although other studies have used the value of off-balance-sheet items, this variable has a significant number of 
missing values in our sample; thus, we rely on noninterest income as an appropriate proxy. 
17
 For detailed information on the assessments of the Basel Core Principles, we refer the reader to their founding 
documents (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1997, 1999, 2006, 2011a, 2011b, 2012). 
18
 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) use BCP compliance data covering the period 1999–2007. 
 international organizations to be the best practice to date of compliance with banking regulation 
and supervision. These principles were issued in 1997 by the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision, and have been adopted by most countries in the world. Since 1999, the IMF and the 
World Bank have conducted regular assessments to gauge countries' compliance with these 
principles, mainly within their joint FSAP. The 25 BCP core principles are organized into seven 
chapters which measure: Preconditions for effective banking supervision (Chapter 1); Licensing 
and structure (Chapter 2); Prudential regulations and requirements (Chapter 3); Methods of 
ongoing supervision (Chapter 4); Information requirements (Chapter 5); Formal powers of 
supervisors (Chapter 6): and Cross-border banking (Chapter 7).  See Table A.3 for more details 
on the variables constructed from these chapters). 
Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011), the level of bank compliance is assessed 
using an aggregate BCP compliance score and a disaggregated approach, to distinguishing 
among various dimensions of regulation and supervision. The variable "BCP compliance" 
specifies a measure of compliance for each country in our sample at one point in time. Bank-
level and country-level information are matched with the year of assessment to produce a cross-
sectional sample. More specifically, to assess the compliance rate with each of the 25 principles, 
a four-point scale is used: (i) noncompliant; (ii) materially noncompliant; (iii) largely compliant, 
and (iv) compliant. Numerical values are assigned to each of the grades (from 0 for 
noncompliant to 3 for compliant). An overall index of compliance is computed based on the sum 
of the seven regulatory dimensions (BCP score).  Seven indexes of compliance are then 
calculated based on the individual dimensions of regulation. All indices are normalized to take 
values in the interval [0, 1].  This normalization also has the intuitively appealing property of a 
percentage interpretation on initial analysis. 
 
3.6 Environmental Variables 
Bank efficiency is normally expressed as a function of both internal and external 
contextual variables. Internal factors are usually related to bank management and are defined 
from a bank’s financial statements and thus specific to its individual character. External factors 
describe the regulatory, macroeconomic, and financial development conditions that are likely to 
affect a bank’s performance. The contextual variables used in this study are chosen to best fit the 
primary purpose of the analysis and include both bank-specific and country-specific variables. 
The bank-specific variables include log of total assets (logta), loans to assets ratio (lta), 
book value equity to assets (eqta) and return on equity (roe). Bank size, lending behaviour, 
capitalization, and risk profile are considered key determinants of bank performance. 
It has long been established in applied bank efficiency studies that bank size (logta) can 
significantly affect bank performance. Banks enjoy economies of scale as they grow larger. One 
of the reasons put forward in the literature is that larger banks can better diversify risk 
(particularly credit and liquidity risk), which should reduce the relative costs of risk 
management. This in turn should allow banks to conserve equity capital, reserves, and liquid 
assets. Further, the spread of overhead costs (especially those associated with information 
technology) can also bring about larger efficiencies of scale in banking production (Hughes and 
Mester, 2013). Although large banks can experience scale diseconomies and there might be costs 
 associated with diversification, we expect an overall positive relationship between size and 
efficiency. 
A bank’s production process is underpinned by its ability to improve information 
asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. This implies that a measure of relative lending 
behavior such as loans to assets (lta) can be an important determinant of bank performance. 
Furthermore, as banks make choices about their capital structure and the amount of risk to 
assume, capitalization decisions have a direct impact on performance. We model this potential 
impact by including equity to assets (eqta). We expect higher levels of capital to be related to a 
reduction in a bank overall risk, and posit a positive relationship between the equity to assets 
ratio and bank performance. Finally, we also control for performance differences resulting from 
a manager’s ability to optimize the risk-return tradeoff, by including a bank's return on equity 
(roe). Although no consistent picture emerges in the literature as to the relationship between risk 
and bank efficiency, a bank risk-taking profile is an important determinant of performance. 
Moving to the external country-specific characteristics, these are a vector of the 
macroeconomic conditions and financial conditions in the banking industry of each country in 
the sample. The business and economic cycle fluctuations are modeled using annual growth in 
GDP (gdpg) and annual rate of inflation (inf) measured as the percentage change in the consumer 
price index. Favorable economic conditions will stimulate an improvement in the supply and 
demand for banking services, and will consequently have a positive effect on bank efficiency 
(Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010). Furthermore, high inflation can affect bank performance in 
a number of ways: it might encourage banks to compete through excessive branch networks, thus 
affecting cost (Kasman and Yildirim, 2006), or it might have a beneficial effect on bank margins 
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al, 2004).  
The level of financial intermediation is controlled by including the ratio of private sector 
banks’ claims to GDP (PrCrGDP) as in (Barth et al, 2004). A higher ratio indicates increased 
loan activity, which is likely to improve bank efficiency. Higher efficiency resulting from high 
intermediation activity may be the effect of a bank’s risk preferences; recall that our model takes 
this into consideration by including equity capital as both a quasi-fixed input and in ratio form 
(eqta) as an environmental variable. 
Lastly, we control for bank sector concentration using the ratio of the assets held by the 
three largest banks as a proportion of all bank assets of the country (conc). Higher concentration 
is thought to have a negative impact on bank efficiency because market power allows managers 
to relax their efforts to improve performance (Berger and Hannan, 1998).
19
  
The primary purpose of our study is to investigate whether BCP compliance plays a role 
in bank performance; therefore, it is vital to appropriately model the regulatory conditions within 
which each bank operates. We include six key features of banking regulation, which were first 
defined in Barth et al, (2004, 2006). RESTR is a measure of the level of restriction placed on a 
bank’s activity. Barth et al, (2004) argue that allowing banks to be involved in a range of 
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 It has also been argued that higher concentration could be the result of efficiency in the production process 
(Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010). 
 activities may encourage the rise of larger, more complex entities that are more difficult to 
regulate. Reduced competition and efficiency may result, because banks may systemically fail to 
manage their diverse set of financial activities beyond the traditional model, lowering 
profitability (Barth et al, 2003).    
COMP measures the level of regulation in place that would reduce competition (this 
includes entry requirements, limitations of foreign bank entry/ownership, and the fraction of new 
applications for banking licenses that are denied). As mentioned above, limited competition is 
likely to induce appropriating management behavior that may have a detrimental effect on bank 
efficiency. CAPRQ measures capital risk management restrictions. Pasiouras et al, (2009) argue 
that capital requirements can affect bank efficiency and productivity in three ways. First, binding 
regulatory capital requirements reduce aggregate lending and affect loan quality, which in turn 
will affect efficiency. Second, stricter capital requirements influence a bank’s asset portfolio 
mix, resulting in different portfolio returns; this will affect input-oriented bank efficiency, 
because these returns will require the management of different resources. Finally, as mentioned 
earlier, differing capital standards will influence a bank’s decisions on the mix of deposits and 
equity, which entail different costs.  
PRMON is a variable measuring the degree of private sector monitoring. This is a proxy 
for the third pillar of Basel II and can be related to the private monitoring hypothesis, which 
argues that supervisory power can incorporate business corruption and/or political motivation 
which, if increased, would affect bank lending integrity and compromise efficient credit 
allocation.20 Many economists support a greater reliance on private sector monitoring to promote 
better-functioning banks, although the quality of private monitoring largely depends on the 
quality of information disclosure. Although we expect the effect to be country-specific, we 
expect a positive link between the degree of private market monitoring and bank efficiency. 
DEPSEC is a measure of the amount of security in place for depositors, in terms of 
deposit insurance schemes. Research suggests that increased levels of deposit insurance will 
exacerbate moral hazard issues and reduce the incentives for private monitoring. In terms of the 
effect on bank efficiency, higher levels of security for depositors would reduce banks' incentives 
to efficiently allocate resources to the most productive opportunities, thereby resulting in a 
negative effect on efficiency. 
CORPGOV is a measure of the level of effective corporate governance; it is derived from 
the External Governance Index. Better external governance is expected to enhance the private 
monitoring and disciplining of banks and thus boost banking efficiency. 
Finally we control for differences in economic development of the countries in our 
sample. Countries are classified into four categories (Major Advanced, Advanced, Emerging and 
Developing, and Transitional) by development status. In addition, to capture regional differences 
we also classify the countries 11 regions: Centrally planned Asia and China (CPA); Central and 
Eastern Europe (EEU); Latin America and the Caribbean (LAM); Middle East and North Africa 
                                                 
20
 The antithesis is the official supervision hypothesis, which suggests that supervision can prevent systemic failures 
by direct oversight, regulation, and disciplinary action against banks.  
 (MEA); Newly Independent States of Former Soviet Union (FSU); North America (NAM); 
Other Pacific Asia (PAS); Pacific OECD (PAO); South Asia (SAS); Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) 
and Western Europe (WEU).  
3.7 Methodology 
The relationship between bank efficiency and regulatory compliance is evaluated using 
the following baseline specification: 
                                                  (4) 
 
where i indexes bank i, j indexes country j,       21 is the efficiency score of bank i in country j, 
estimated by means of Data Envelopment Analysis and bias-corrected, as discussed in Section 
3.3. BCPIndexj is the overall compliance index for country j, as discussed in Section 3.5. The 
remaining environmental variables are included to capture observable cross-country and bank-
characteristic differences. These have been discussed in Section 3.6; Table A.3 presents the 
details of how variables were constructed.  
More specifically, Rj is a vector of bank regulatory condition indicators (described in Barth et al, 
(2006) for country j; MFj is a vector of macroeconomic and financial condition variables for 
country i; Bi,j is a vector of bank-specific characteristics for each bank i in country j, and Ij is a 
vector of dummy variables controlling for regional or economic development differences. The 
error terms      and       are assumed to be random noise elements of the dependent variable 
      . 
We estimate the model using a truncated regression in the double bootstrap procedure, as 
detailed in Section 3.3. 
In a second step, we decompose our main variable of interest, BCP, into the seven 
component chapters using the following disaggregated model:22  
 
                                               (5) 
where BCPchj is an index of compliance, calculated based on the individual dimensions of 
regulation: BCPch1 is Preconditions for Effective Banking Supervision; BCPch2 is Licensing and 
Structure; BCPch3 is Prudential Regulations and Requirements; BCPch4 is Methods of OnGoing 
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 Depending on the steps of our analysis this variable will differ. In the second step of our approach this would be 
the original DEA score estimated in the first step. In the third step of our approach this would be the bias-corrected 
efficiency estimate from the second step. 
22 Given the high correlations between the BCP chapters, we used Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and the 
first principal component of each chapter was also used to assess whether bank input efficiency was harmed by sub 
chapter compliance. The empirical results were broadly similar to those reported in the main findings in Table 3a 
and 3b. 
 
 Supervision; BCPch5 is Information Requirements; BCPch6 is Formal Powers of Supervisors, 
and BCPch7 is Cross-Border Banking. The remaining variables are defined as in equation (4). 
3.8 Summary Statistics 
Table 1a presents summary statistics of the full sample. Panel 1 describes the mean and 
standard deviation of each variable, while panel 2 provides an exposition of the median values 
categorized by economic development. Table 1b presents the correlation matrix of the BCP 
chapters. A few salient features emerge. 
 
[Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics] 
[Table 1b: Correlation Matrix] 
 
Bank-level variables in panel 1 illustrate a host of differences between the 75 nations in 
our cross-country survey, indicative of variations in banking industry sophistication. The median 
values suggest that the sample is positively skewed, with a small number of large banks. 
Furthermore, there is a high degree of full-sample heterogeneity, with values varying widely 
about their means according to standard deviation figures.   
From panel 1 the full-sample mean of the overall BCP compliance index (BCPscore) is 
0.27, a much lower value than in the Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011) study. This 
difference is likely owing to the inclusion of the U.S. banking sector, which dominates the 
sample and performed poorly in their 2010 BCP compliance assessment. 
From panel 2 a number of interesting sample features emerge. First, overall compliance 
with the BCP appears to be higher in emerging and developing countries (47 percent), suggesting 
that these countries adhere more closely to BCP because their banking industries are nascent. A 
closer look at the regulatory control variables of emerging market and developing countries also 
suggests that these banking industries have many more restrictions placed on their activities 
(RESTR = 0.61), lack competition (COMP=0.64), and have negligible security in place for 
depositors (DEPSEC=0.02). All these characteristics would suggest a greater sensitivity to BCP 
compliance of banks in developing countries. 
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis. First we present the bias-
corrected efficiency estimates. We then present the results of the truncated regression analysis to 
infer how various (bank-specific and country-specific) factors influence the (bias-corrected) 
estimated efficiency. 
4.1 Efficiency Estimations 
We begin our empirical investigation with the estimation of (bias-corrected) efficiency 
scores. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the bias-corrected DEA estimates. These include 
 the coefficient of variation (CV, the standard deviation scaled by the mean).23 This is a scale-free 
measure of dispersion that represents a comparative measure of efficiency volatility, with lower 
values indicative of more stable bank performance.  
The results are presented in three panels, one for each of the groupings mentioned above. 
In panels 1 and 2 estimates are disaggregated by level of economic development, while in panel 
3 the disaggregation is by geographical region. 
Firstly, the overall mean bias-corrected input technical efficiency is 0.479 (the equivalent 
mean for the Non-U.S. bank sample and the emerging market and developing countries bank 
sample are 0.542 and 0.649 respectively). This mean value implies that a typical bank could 
improve its input efficiency by 52 percent; or, if the average bank were producing on the frontier 
rather than at its current location, only 48 percent of inputs being used would be required to 
produce the output set.  
This global average is lower than in recent studies (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras 2010; 
Pasiouras 2008) that used DEA methods and similar samples. This difference is perhaps 
attributed to our explicit treatment of sample heterogeneity in the efficiency estimates.  
As discussed above, nonparametric efficiency estimates using a heterogeneous global 
sample are inherently biased and will provide a more favorable picture of bank efficiency if this 
bias is ignored. A comparison of the overall mean raw efficiency24 (0.596) and its bias-corrected 
counterpart (0.479) suggests that, on average, this estimated bias is 0.11. The comparative 
estimate of average bias in the non-U.S. and emerging market and developing country bank 
samples is 0.068 and 0.14 respectively.25 The bias-corrected efficiency estimates thus reveal that 
the performance of banks is generally more inefficient than the raw, uncorrected DEA estimates 
suggest. 
 
[Table 2: Bank efficiency estimates] 
 
Second, there are some trends evident when moving from advanced to less advanced 
economies. In panel 1, mean efficiency scores exhibit little difference across major advanced and 
advanced country banks, while banks located in emerging market, developing, and transition 
countries are, on average, less efficient. Panel 2 results for the non-U.S. sample provide a much 
clearer picture of this trend. The most efficient banks are located in the major advanced countries 
(mean=0.619) while the least efficient banks are located in the emerging market and developing 
countries (mean=0.498).   
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 The coefficient of variation is also known as the relative standard error; the standard error of an estimate (in this 
instance the mean) divided by the estimate itself. 
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 The summary statistics of these original (raw) DEA estimates are presented in Table A.2 of the appendix. 
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 To provide a complete picture of the bias, these averages should be assessed in conjunction with their standard 
deviations. The standard deviation of the bias estimates for the full, non-U.S., and emerging market and developing 
country bank samples are 0.09, 0.11, and 0.22 respectively.  The latter suggests the average bias in the emerging and 
developing has much more variability around its mean value. This increased variability is likely the result of much 
greater heterogeneity across banks in this subsample. 
 Third, there appears to be an increase in the dispersion of bank efficiency estimates as we 
move from the most developed to the least developed countries. Panels 1 and 2 show some 
differences in the coefficient of variation across developmental levels, with major advanced 
country banks exhibiting the most stability in efficiency estimates (lower CV figure) while 
emerging market and developing country banks experience the most volatility in efficiency 
estimates (higher CV figure). This trend is most pronounced in the full sample, where the 
coefficient of variation of the emerging and developing country banks (0.917) is double the 
corresponding figure for major advanced country banks (0.462). 
The latter findings suggest that bank efficiency in emerging markets and developing 
countries is much more volatile. This increased volatility would suggest the necessity for tighter 
compliance with a set of effective banking supervision principles, and indicates the need for a 
more detailed analysis of these banks.  Results from this analysis are summarized in panel 3: 
they suggest that a typical emerging market and developing country bank has a bias-corrected 
efficiency of 0.649 when benchmarked against best-practice peers of this subsample.26 This 
suggests that, on average, a bank producing on this emerging market and developing country 
bank frontier, instead of at its current location, would only need 65 percent of its inputs to 
produce the same amount of outputs. Overall there is little discernible difference across regions 
for banks located in emerging market and developing countries.27 
 
4.2 Truncated Regression Results  
The main aim of this study is to provide consistent estimation of the relationship between 
bank efficiency and BCP compliance, given the heterogeneous nature of the sample. Using the 
approach described in Section 3.7, we adopt two model specifications to provide a commentary 
on whether overall BCP compliance or compliance with any of its component chapters influence 
bank efficiency. Following Simar and Wilson (2007), we use a truncated regression model to 
investigate how producer-specific and country-level variables influence bank efficiency, with 
parameters being estimated by maximum likelihood. The authors’ Algorithm 2 provides a 
consistent method to obtain the bootstrapped confidence intervals for these estimates. 
Specifically, the confidence intervals are constructed via the second part of the Simar and Wilson 
(2007) Algorithm 2 double bootstrapping procedure, using 30,000 replications. Table 3a presents 
parameter estimates for the full sample; Table 3b provides parameter estimates for the sample 
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 This is the average distance of a typical bank from a global frontier built using a sample of only the emerging 
market and developing country banks. 
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 When regional comparisons are considered, no obvious trends emerge.  Banks located in CPA countries 14 
Chinese banks and 2 Vietnamese banks) are, on average, more efficient than those in other regions, with a mean 
bias-corrected technical efficiency of 0.75. Furthermore, these banks experience more stability in their efficiency 
levels, with a lower coefficient of variation.  At the other extreme, banks located in WEU countries (this category 
includes 10 Turkish banks) are, on average, the least efficient in all the regions, with a mean bias-corrected 
efficiency of 0.514.    
 excluding the U.S. banks, and Table 3c provides parameter estimates for the emerging and 
developing banks sample.28 
 
 
4.2.1 Effects of BCP compliance  
 
None of the regression results provide robust statistical evidence to suggest that overall 
BCP compliance or compliance with any of the individual chapters has a positive influence on 
bias-corrected bank efficiency. This adds further support to the argument that BCP compliance 
has no impact on the operational performance of individual banks, and may also reflect the 
inability of assessors to provide a consistent cross-country evaluation of effective banking 
regulation (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2011). 
 
[Tables 3a & 3b & 3c: Truncated regressions] 
 
4.2.2 Effects of bank characteristics  
 
From Tables 3a-3c, it is clear that bank-specific variables play an important role in 
explaining the variability of bias-corrected bank input efficiency. Typically, larger, more actively 
lending banks (that is, banks with higher loan-to-asset ratios) are more efficient; this finding 
persists across the two subsamples. 
 
4.2.3 Effects of economic and financial conditions 
 
Across the groupings analyzed, no consistent relationships between bias-corrected input 
bank efficiency and economic/financial conditions emerge. The full sample assessment suggests 
that banks in countries with higher relative economic growth (illustrated by GDP growth) are 
typically more efficient. Moreover, higher levels of financial intermediation (illustrated by the 
ratio of private sector banks’ claims to GDP - PrCrGDP) are positively associated with bank 
efficiency. These finding are consistent with previous studies (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras 
2010; Pasiouras 2008) and suggest that favorable macroeconomic conditions will positively 
affect the supply and demand of banking services, improving bank efficiency.  
The results provide some evidence to suggest that concentration in the banking industry 
has a detrimental effect on bank efficiency, as indicated by the negative association between 
bank concentration (CONC) and bias-corrected bank input efficiency, from model 1 results using 
the regional dummies.  
 
                                                 
28
 Given the high correlations between the BCP chapters; the first principal component of each chapter was also 
used to assess whether bank input efficiency was impacted by sub chapter compliance. The empirical results were 
broadly similar to those reported in the main findings in Table 3a-3c. 
 4.2.4 Regulatory effects  
 
Similarly, there is little evidence of pattern when regulatory effects across the three 
groupings are considered. The full sample results provide some evidence to suggest that 
regulation which enhances private monitoring (PRMON) also increases bank efficiency, while 
regulation which stifles competition negatively affects bank efficiency. These findings add 
support to the private monitoring hypothesis; regulation that requires a bank to provide accurate 
and timely information to the public allows private agents to overcome information and 
transaction costs, enabling them to monitor banks more effectively. The latter finding is 
consistent with the recent finding that tighter restrictions on bank activities have a negative effect 
on bank efficiency (Barth et al, 2013).  
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that corporate governance has a positive 
influence on bank efficiency, while increased depositor protection and restrictions on activity 
have a negative impact.   
4.3 Regulatory Compliance in Emerging Markets 
Because of the significant differences between emerging markets and advanced 
economies, in this part of the analysis we focus on a sample of emerging market and developing 
economies. Differences in the level of institutional development, law and order, contract 
enforcement, and corruption, for example, may affect both the level of compliance and the 
efficiency of banking institutions. We therefore examine whether the impact of regulatory 
compliance on bank efficiency is conditional upon the level of development. A higher level of 
compliance would provide a secure environment for stable industry growth, and thus improve 
banking efficiency; however, regulatory compliance with international standards is costly and 
could negatively affect bank resource allocation. 
To this end, we re-estimate the (bias-corrected) efficiency scores on our subsample of 
banks from emerging market and developing economies, and then proceed with the two-stage 
analysis. The results are reported in Table 3c. Although the results on the aggregate BCP index 
do not support the hypothesis of an association between regulatory compliance and bank 
efficiency, when we explore the relationship between efficiency and compliance with the 
different chapters or group of principles, we find some evidence of a negative relation. In 
particular, for banks in emerging countries, compliance with Chapter 4 (Methods of Ongoing 
Supervision) has a negative and significant impact on the bias-corrected efficiency measures. 
Specifically, this chapter relates to the effectiveness of the existing supervisory framework and 
ability of supervisors to carry out their duties. Against a background of (potentially) increased 
supervisory scrutiny required to meet international standards, banks are likely to face more 
substantive compliance costs, such as investments in accounting systems, risk management 
systems, equipment, and training. This in turn can distort their business objectives, lowering 
investment and decreasing lending, and resulting in lower efficiency. 
On the other hand, the extent to which supervisors apply international global standards is 
positively associated with bank input efficiency (Chapter 7). This latter result may indicate that 
 in emerging markets, adherence to international standards of best practice has a positive effect on 
bank performance.  
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
For the purpose of robustness we re-estimate the models using the Papke and Wooldridge 
(1996) fractional logit regression approach, as described in McDonald (2009). He argues that 
DEA efficiency is the outcome of a fractional logit process (taking values between zero and one) 
rather than a latent variable from a truncated process, as described by Simar and Wilson (2007). 
Using the raw uncorrected DEA estimates, the last four columns of Tables 3a-3c report the 
parameters estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood methods. Overall, the results seem to 
corroborate our key findings.  Specifically, we continue to find no evidence of any beneficial 
relationship between bank efficiency and compliance with the BCPs.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the impact of regulation and supervision 
on bank performance. Using World Bank Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision 
(BCP) assessments conducted from 1999 to 2014, we evaluate how compliance with BCP affects 
bank performance for a sample of 1,146 publicly listed banks drawn from a broad cross-section 
of 75 countries. 
Our results indicate that overall BCP compliance, or indeed compliance with any of its 
individual chapters, has no association with bank efficiency. This result holds after controlling 
for bank-specific characteristics, the macroeconomic environment, institutional quality, and the 
existing regulatory framework, and adds further support to the argument that although 
compliance has little effect on bank efficiency, increasing regulatory constraints may prevent 
banks from efficiently allocating resources. When only banks in emerging market and 
developing countries are considered, we find some evidence of a negative relation with specific 
chapters that relate to the effectiveness of the existing supervisory framework and the ability of 
supervisors to carry out their duties. However, these results need to be treated with caution, 
because they may also reflect the inability of assessors to provide a consistent cross-country 
evaluation of effective banking regulation. 
One limitation of this type of analysis is that compliance with the Basel Core Principles 
for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP) is measured at a particular point in time and does not 
allow for taking into account the evolution of each country's banking system in compliance with 
international regulatory standards. However, a small number of countries in the sample have 
been surveyed twice. By focusing on these countries, it would be possible to assess the impact of 
the changes in compliance scores, both for those countries whose bank performance has moved 
closer to international standards and for those countries which have underperformed. 
As regulators refine and improve their approach and methodologies in response to the 
financial crisis, our result highlight the need to balance the objective of financial stability with an 
increasing number of rules that can potentially impact unfavorably on the efficiency of banks 
intermediation function. Our results show that, conditional on being a good bank, regulatory 
 compliance per se has no association with bank performance and therefore an excessive 
confidence in rule-based regulation might hamper monitoring efforts and a deeper understanding 
of banks’ risk taking. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
TABLES IN BODY OF TEXT 
Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel 1: Full sample summary statistics  Panel 2: Median values by economic 
development 
 Mean Median SD  Advanced Emerging 
and 
Developing 
Major 
Advanced 
Transition 
Bank level variables        
Inputs (Mil $)        
Deposits and short term funding 20,462.55 3,961.49 37,319.42  34,311.71 3,079.48 2,369.86 261.11 
Total costs 653.55 214.2 1,112.16  627 191.42 121.71 28.35 
Equity 1,977.82 404.79 3,691.60  2,487.42 291.33 241.7 41.24 
Outputs (Mil $)        
Loans 15,847.40 2,712.63 29,947.64  27,006.05 1,738.83 1,891.88 195.66 
Other Earning Assets 9,012.30 1,469.77 17,866.55  13,414.36 1,352.53 737.44 74.58 
Non-Interest Income 260.74 45.1 516.89  236.01 46.53 24.41 9.7 
Bank Characteristics        
Total Assets (Mil $) 28,567.79 5,018.05 55,800.59  43,343.16 3,774.13 3,060.73 330.78 
Loan to Assets 0.58 0.61 0.15  0.61 0.56 0.65 0.57 
Equity to Assets 0.1 0.08 0.07  0.06 0.09 0.09 0.12 
Return on Equity 0.05 0.1 0.5  0.09 0.18 0.05 0.11 
Country level variables        
Regulatory variables*        
RESTR 0.56 0.61 0.14  0.47 0.61 0.61 0.44 
COMP 0.49 0.5 0.21  0.33 0.64 0.5 0.83 
CAPRQ 0.55 0.62 0.2  0.61 0.5 0.62 0.62 
PRMON 0.67 0.71 0.15  0.71 0.6 0.8 0.5 
DEPSEC 0.27 0.25 0.2  0.44 0.02 0.17 0.42 
CORPGOV 0.68 0.69 0.16  0.77 0.72 0.69 0.46 
BCP variables*        
BCPscore 0.27 0.25 0.21  0.31 0.47 0.04 0.31 
BCPch1 0.34 0.29 0.28  0.43 0.59 0 0.47 
BCPch2 0.2 0.2 0.21  0.2 0.3 0 0.3 
BCPch3 0.31 0.24 0.17  0.24 0.38 0.21 0.38 
BCPch4 0.22 0.14 0.2  0.25 0.33 0.07 0.29 
BCPch5 0.18 0 0.21  0 0.33 0 0.33 
BCPch6 0.21 0.33 0.24  0.33 0.33 0 0.33 
BCPch7 0.23 0.17 0.19  0.12 0.42 0.08 0.33 
Other Controls        
Inflation 0.88 0.03 2.17  0.03 0.08 0.01 0.12 
Private Credit per GDP 29.42 2.01 56.52  115.88 0.55 2.01 0.42 
Concentration 0.56 0.5 0.21  0.68 0.56 0.42 0.73 
GDP growth 0.88 0.05 2.05  1.65 0.13 0.04 0.17 
The above variables describe the full sample of 1,146 banks.  All bank-level monetary values are deflated to 2005 prices.  *These 
variables have been normalized to take values in the interval [0, 1]. The normalized variables also have the intuitively appealing 
property of a percentage interpretation. 
  
 Table 1b: Correlation Matrix of BCP chapter variables 
 
 BCPch1 BCPch2 BCPch3 BCPch4 BCPch5 BCPch6 BCPch7 
BCPch1 1.00        
BCPch2 0.71 1.00      
BCPch3 0.65 0.76 1.00      
BCPch4 0.68 0.78 0.84 1.00    
BCPch5 0.70 0.75 0.71 0.73 1.00     
BCPch6 0.69 0.53 0.57 0.61 0.53 1.00   
BCPch7 0.64 0.59 0.70 0.68 0.58 0.54 1.00 
Given the high correlations between the BCP chapters; the first principal component of each chapter was also used to assess 
whether bank input efficiency was impacted by sub chapter compliance. The empirical results were broadly similar to those 
reported in the main findings in Table 3a-3c. 
 
 
  
 Table 2: Bank efficiency estimates 
Panel 1: Full Sample EFFbc SD CV 
All (n=1146) 0.479 0.272 0.568 
Advanced (n=241) 0.487 0.241 0.495 
Emerging and Developing (n=359) 0.41 0.376 0.917 
Major Advanced (n=415) 0.567 0.262 0.462 
Transition (n=131) 0.454 0.268 0.590 
Panel 2: Non US Sample    
All (n=850) 0.542 0.258 0.476 
Advanced (n=243) 0.551 0.22 0.399 
Emerging and Developing (n=359) 0.498 0.234 0.470 
Major Advanced (n=117) 0.619 0.2 0.323 
Transition (n=131) 0.524 0.217 0.414 
Panel 3: Emerging and Developing Sample 
   
All (n=359) 0.649 0.201 0.3097 
Central and Eastern Europe (EEU) (n=7) 0.645 0.176 0.2729 
Centrally planned Asia and China (CPA) (n=16) 0.75 0.136 0.1813 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAM) (n=67) 0.713 0.253 0.3548 
Middle East and North Africa (MEA) (n=59) 0.63 0.149 0.2365 
Newly Independent States of FSU (FSU) (n=8) 0.748 0.27 0.3610 
Other Pacific Asia (PAS) (n=57) 0.605 0.137 0.2264 
South Asia (SAS) (n=107) 0.626 0.195 0.3115 
Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) (n=28) 0.669 0.222 0.3318 
Western Europe (WEU) (n=10) 0.514 0.257 0.5000 
EFFbc =Bias-corrected input technical efficiency under variable returns to scaled.  This table presents efficiency scores averaged 
by developmental level and region.  The results in all panels were obtained using model 1. The standard deviation (SD) and the 
coefficient of variation (CV) are reported for the EFFbc estimates. 
 
 
 
  
 Table 3a: Full Sample Analysis 
 Truncated Regression Fractional Logit Regression 
Predictors Baseline Disaggregated Baseline Disaggregated 
Basel Core Principles        
BCPscore -0.0731 -0.0019   -0.11154 -0.0234   
BCPch1   -0.0127 -0.0191   -0.077 -0.1873 
BCPch2   0.044 0.0332   0.431 0.2001 
BCPch3   0.0461 0.0711   0.3276 0.0832 
BCPch4   -0.0258 -0.0519   -0.2592 -0.4327 
BCPch5   -0.0444 -0.0045   -0.1325 -0.2115 
BCPch6   -0.0112 -0.0221   -0.0877 -0.0673 
BCPch7   0.0457 0.009   0.1325 0.0771 
Bank Specific        
logta 0.0113** 0.0149** 0.0216** 0.0124** 0.0768*** 0.0667** 0.0887*** 0.0776*** 
lta 0.315** 0.1234** 0.2315** 0.2612** 0.0623*** 0.0761*** 0.569*** 0.7322*** 
EqTa -0.0912 -0.1116 -0.0178 -0.0471 -0.6554 -0.5477 -0.2105 -0.5611 
roe -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0088 -0.0241 -0.0431 -0.0543 -0.0521 
Country Specific        
infl -0.0224* -0.1922** -0.0165 -0.1623 -0.2097* -0.8707* -0.3321* -0.0543* 
gdpg 0.138** 0.0013 0.247 0.1295** 0.3214 0.2341** 0.6752 0.5643 
PrCrGDP 0.4312 0.3211** 0.2614 0.151** 0.1147 0.2134** 0.2341* 0.3421* 
conc -0.012 -0.3221** -0.0421* -0.0331* -0.1322 -0.0431*** -0.2665 -0.1651 
caprq 0.0121 0.042 0.0331 0.0231 0.1776 0.0165 0.0712 0.0127 
comp -0.2193** -0.1087** -0.1412** -0.0977** -0.5477** -0.3341** -0.0156* -0.032* 
prmon 0.1114** 0.0812* 0.1712** 0.0696* 0.4501* 0.2033** 0.7012* 0.554** 
depsec -0.0568* -0.1591** -0.0313 -0.0132 -0.3192* -0.4521** -0.2112 -0.032 
corpgov 0.0312** 0.0511 0.0413 0.0543 0.1876 0.1365 0.0912 0.1921 
restr -0.0812 -0.1059 -0.0326* -0.2087** -0.1913 -0.3265 -0.0431 -0.5611* 
Developmental/Regional dummies       
ED -0.0213*   -0.0219**  -0.1912  -0.1657  
MA -0.0940**   -0.1012**  -0.114  -0.3564  
T -0.0612*   -0.0141*  -0.0643  -0.1612  
CPA  -0.112  -0.0122  -0.443  -0.3221 
EEU  -0.124*  -0.029  -0.0667  -0.0812 
LAM   -0.0215**  -0.0621*  -0.541**  -0.5321* 
MEA   -0.0238  -0.0611  -0.2443  -0.183 
FSU   -0.0221  -0.019*  -0.0211  -0.033 
PAS   -0.1211  -0.0114  -0.5611**  -0.3227* 
PAO   0.332**  0.212**  -0.7651**  -0.6658** 
SAS   -0.0121  -0.0662  -0.0341  -0.012 
AFR   -0.0329  -0.0511  -0.0613  -0.1218 
WEU   0.0992**  0.0771  0.617**  0.3114 
Year 
dummies 
included 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.3481** 0.2141** 0.1112** 0.0924** 0.2123** 0.1124** 0.0919** 0.0878** 
Obs 1146 1146 1146 1146 850 850 850 850 
Dependent variable is EFFbc,i,j = the bias-corrected input technical efficiency estimates.*** p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 
1% level according to bootstrapped confidence intervals, ** p<0.05 Significance at the 5% level according to bootstrapped 
confidence intervals, * p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level according to bootstrapped confidence intervals. 30,000 
replications were used to calculate the bootstrapped confidence intervals for the above parameter estimates. For definition os 
dummy variables see body of text.  In the full sample model the benchmark economic group is Advance Economies and the 
benchmark region is North America, in the no US model the benchmark region is Central & Eastern Europe.  For the fractional 
logit analysis EFFi,j =the original uncorrected raw DEA efficiency estimates. 
 Table 3b: No U.S. Analysis 
 Truncated Regression Fractional Logit Regression 
Predictors Baseline Disaggregated Baseline Disaggregated 
Basel Core Principles        
BCPscore -0.0812 -0.0442    -0.1456 -0.1556   
BCPch1    -0.105 -0.0812   -0.3387* -0.1097* 
BCPch2    0.0289 0.0043   0.2651 0.0703 
BCPch3    0.0434 0.0811   0.3408 0.4407 
BCPch4    -0.1123 -0.2122   -0.0124 -0.0933* 
BCPch5    -0.1135 -0.0443   -0.0456 -0.0891 
BCPch6    -0.0332 -0.0291   -0.1533 -0.0783 
BCPch7    0.0435 0.0021   0.2012 0.0912 
Bank Specific        
logta 0.0145** 0.0219** 0.0321** 0.0221** 0.3032** 0.1277*** 0.2081*** 0.2992*** 
lta 0.0152* 0.0224** 0.0012 0.0265 0.0442* 0.0765* 0.0112** 0.0881* 
EqTa -0.0031 -0.015 -0.0112 -0.0224 -0.1943 -0.2314 -0.1103 -0.0945 
roe -0.0332 -0.0843 -0.0167 -0.0181 -0.0888 -0.0812 -0.0934 -0.0843 
Country Specific        
infl -0.147 -0.3121 -0.1014 -0.2212 -0.0332* -0.3421* -0.5611 -0.2234 
gdpg 0.0355 0.0241 0.0174 0.0478 0.2341 0.0895 0.0345 0.1451 
PrCrGDP 0.1232 0.2125 0.276 0.1971 0.1556 0.0431 0.0432 0.0954 
conc -0.0214 -0.0142 -0.043 -0.051 -0.0541 -0.0254 -0.1943 -0.1642 
caprq 0.044 0.0691 0.00421 0.0453 0.0546 0.0321 0.0541 0.0445 
comp -0.0125 -0.031 -0.0331 -0.0321 -0.1332* -0.1670 -0.2134 -00235 
prmon 0.125 0.0431 0.0912 0.0612 0.0995 0.0341 0.0341 0.0991 
depsec -0.0151* -0.0512 -0.044 -0.0215 -0.0941 -0.2941 0.2112 -0.0936 
corpgov 0.0775 0.0923 0.0812 0.0912 0.2551 0.6511** 0.2432* 0.0176 
restr -0.0472 -0.0651 -0.2104 -0.3122 -0.5412* -0.2126** -0.1265* -0.2177** 
Developmental/Regional dummies       
ED -0.0612   -0.0312  -0.0725  -0.2144  
MA 0.031   0.032  -0.2316  0.1762  
T -0.0321   -0.061  -0.0823  -0.0744  
CPA  0.221  0.0132  0.7761  0.6431** 
LAM   0.055   0.034**   0.3241  0.2213 
MEA   0.0412   0.0611   -0.0432  -0.0215 
FSU   -0.0121*   -0.0221   -0.0128***  0.046** 
PAS   0.0712   0.0182*   0.5021*  0.4215 
PAO   0.1143   0.0921   0.0212  0.0401 
SAS   0.0021   0.0098   0.1761  0.1831 
AFR   0.0314   0.0512   0.1881**  0.4218* 
WEU   0.0667**   0.0565*   0.7761  0.6431** 
Year 
dummies 
included 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  0.2123** 0.1124** 0.0919** 0.0878** 0.5477 0.9981* 0.8019 0.8643* 
Obs 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 
Dependent variable is EFFbc,i,j = the bias-corrected input technical efficiency estimates.*** p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 
1% level according to bootstrapped confidence intervals, ** p<0.05 Significance at the 5% level according to bootstrapped 
confidence intervals, * p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level according to bootstrapped confidence intervals. 30,000 
replications were used to calculate the bootstrapped confidence intervals for the above parameter estimates. For definition os 
dummy variables see body of text.  In the full sample model the benchmark economic group is Advance Economies and the 
benchmark region is North America, in the no US model the benchmark region is Central & Eastern Europe.  For the fractional 
logit analysis EFFi,j =the original uncorrected raw DEA efficiency estimates. 
 
  
Table 3c: Emerging and Developing Countries Analysis 
Truncated Regression Fractional logit Regression  
Predictors Baseline Disaggregated Baseline Disaggregated 
Basel Core Principles        
BCPscore -0.1211 -0.0422   -0.166 -0.4366   
BCPch1     -0.4113 -0.1223   -0.2231* -0.1313 
BCPch2     0.0211 0.0321   0.3321 0.3026* 
BCPch3     0.3211 0.1632   0.4431 0.3217 
BCPch4     -0.6112* -0.1224   -0.5471** -0.0221 
BCPch5     -0.1432 -0.1231   -0.4561 -0.2611 
BCPch6     -0.2122 -0.0178   -0.3411 -0.2912 
BCPch7     0.4112* 0.2177   0.2170** 0.4316 
Bank Specific         
logta 0.0511** 0.0124** 0.0421** 0.0239** 0.3321** 0.2518** 0.2114*** 0.2091** 
lta 0.221** 0.132** 0.1712** 0.0899** 0.4431** 0.5561* 0.6651** 0.5667*** 
EqTa 0.1812* 0.1165** 0.1774 0.3181* 0.9981 1.0112 0.9234 0.7993* 
roe -0.0034 -0.0076 -0.022 -0.012 -0.0421 -0.0321 -0.2223 -0.1334 
Country Specific        
infl -0.6123 -0.4356* -0.1901* -0.0914* -0.3314* -0.2387 0.1239** -0.3211* 
gdpg 0.0214 0.2113 0.7661 0.1892 0.0671 0.0554 0.4012** 0.3121* 
PrCrGDP 0.0124 0.0563 0.0112 0.2131 0.0617** 0.2112** 0.0991 0.4311 
conc -0.0321 -0.0761 -0.0612 -0.0134 -0.214* -0.1542** -0.0282 -0.0212 
caprq -0.0321 -0.0655 -0.4321 -0.1376 -0.1197 -0.2191 -0.9321 -0.4494 
comp -0.0123 -0.0328 -0.5417 -0.0345 -0.2123 -0.0184 -0.6221* -0.2501 
prmon 0.0043 0.0165 0.6782 0.0832 0.3321 0.056 0.3016* 0.0321 
depsec -0.0432 -0.0657 -0.211* -0.3214* -0.8134 -0.4193 -0.0912 -0.813 
corpgov 0.0765 0.1455 0.3251 0.0130 0.411 0.0328 0.5115 0.0781 
restr -0.0215 -0.1321 -0.7141 -0.4537 -0.0541 -0.221 -0.443* -0.391 
Regional dummies        
CPA  0.1123  0.3211  0.4431  0.2191 
LAM  -0.1231  -0.2112  -0.2151  -0.4165 
MEA  -0.1112  -0.1582  -0.2134  -0.261 
FSU  0.0012  0.0045  0.0212  0.0374 
PAS  -0.0238  -0.0065  -0.0221  -0.0186 
PAO  -0.1276  -0.2112  -0.3291  -0.2556 
SAS  -0.0333  -0.0062  -0.0849  -0.0518 
AFR  -0.0774  -0.0828  -0.0882  -0.0912 
WEU  -0.0327  -0.0155  -0.0761  -0.0221 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant term 0.2815 0.4504 1.2641** 0.1664 -0.1761** -0.7616** -0.7711** -0.6651* 
Observations 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 359 
Dependent variable is EFFbc,i,j = the bias-corrected input technical efficiency estimates.*** p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 
1% level according to bootstrapped confidence intervals, ** p<0.05 Significance at the 5% level according to bootstrapped 
confidence intervals, * p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level according to bootstrapped confidence intervals. 30,000 
replications were used to calculate the bootstrapped confidence intervals for the above parameter estimates. For definition os 
dummy variables see body of text.  In the full sample model the benchmark economic group is Advance Economies and the 
benchmark region is North America, in the no US model the benchmark region is Central & Eastern Europe.  For the fractional 
logit analysis EFFi,j =the original uncorrected raw DEA efficiency estimates. 
  
 APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Full Sample 
Country Number of banks Year BCP assessment Country Number of banks Year BCP assessment 
Armenia 1 2005 Kuwait 6 2003 
Australia 9 2005,2012 Latvia 2 2001 
Austria 7 2003,2013 Lebanon 3 2001 
Bahrain 1 2005 Lithuania 4 2001 
Bangladesh 23 2009 Luxembourg 2 2001 
Belgium 1 2013 Malawi 2 2007 
Bolivia 4 2003 Malaysia 7 2012 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 13 2005 Malta 4 2002 
Brazil 4 2012 Mauritius 3 2002,2007 
Chile 7 2003 Mexico 9 2006,2011 
China 14 2011 Moldova Rep. Of 8 2007 
Croatia 23 2001,2007 Morocco 5 2007 
Cyprus 2 2005 Netherlands 3 2011 
Czech Republic 2 2000,2011 Nigeria 3 2012 
Denmark 15 2005,2014 Oman 4 2003,2011 
Ecuador 6 2003 Panama 5 2001 
Egypt 21 2002 Peru 9 2005,2011 
Estonia 1 2000 Philippines 17 2001 
Finland 2 2001 Poland 11 2000 
France 14 2012 Portugal 4 2005 
Germany 15 2003,2011 Romania 3 2008 
Ghana 4 2000 Russian Federation 64 2002,2008,2011 
Greece 10 2005 Singapore 4 2002,2013 
Guyana 2 2005 Slovakia 5 2002 
Honduras 13 2002,2007 Slovenia 1 2000 
Hong Kong 7 2002,2014 South Africa 6 2010` 
Hungary 2 2000 Spain 13 2005,2012 
India 70 2000,2012 Sri Lanka 14 2001,2007 
Indonesia 23 2000,2010 Sweden 6 2001,2011 
Ireland 3 2014 Switzerland 6 2001 
Israel 8 2000 Syrian Arab Rep. 5 2008 
Italy 33 2003,2013 Thailand 10 1999 
Jamaica 2 2005 Trinidad & Tobago 2 2005 
Japan 162 2002,2012 Turkey 10 2011 
Jordan 6 2003 United Kingdom 8 2011 
Kenya 10 2003,2009 Ukraine 1 2002 
Korea Rep. Of 15 2001,2013 U.S.A 301 2010 
      Vietnam 2 2013 
  
 
Table A.2: Summary statistics for original DEA estimates 
Panel 1: Full Sample Raw DEA Efficiency Scores 
All (n=1146) 0.596 
Advanced (n=241) 0.661 
Emerging and Developing (n=359) 0.531 
Major Advanced (n=415) 0.622 
Transition (n=131) 0.589 
Panel 2: Non US Sample  
All (n=850) 0.661 
Advanced (n=243) 0.69 
Emerging and Developing (n=359) 0.612 
Major Advanced (n=117) 0.771 
Transition (n=131) 0.621 
Panel 2: Emerging and Developing Sample  
All (n=359) 0.789 
Central and Eastern Europe (EEU) (n=7) 0.745 
Centrally planned Asia and China (CPA) (n=16) 0.715 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAM) (n=67) 0.75 
Middle East and North Africa (MEA) (n=59) 0.69 
Newly Independent States of FSU (FSU) (n=8) 0.791 
Other Pacific Asia (PAS) (n=57) 0.641 
South Asia (SAS) (n=107) 0.701 
Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) (n=28) 0.667 
Western Europe (WEU) (n=10) 0.66 
These are the Original (raw) input technical efficiency estimated under a variable returns to scale assumption.  
 
  
 Table A.3: Variable definitions 
 
Variables Definition Original Source  
Financial Intermediation Model 
Bank outputs   
Loans Total loans (mil USD) Bankscope 
Other earning assets Total other earning assets (mil USD) Bankscope 
Non-interest income Total noninterest income and other fee-based income (mil USD). This measure accounts for 
nontraditional banking activities in the financial intermediation process. 
Bankscope 
Bank inputs   
Customer deposits and short term 
funding 
Total customer deposits and short-term funding (mil USD) Bankscope 
Total costs Total of interest and noninterest expenses (mil USD) Bankscope 
Equity Capital Total Equity (mil USD).  This measure is used to adequately capture the impact of risk in the financial 
intermediation process. 
Bankscope 
Other Variables 
Dependent variables in regression models  
EFFraw,i,j Original (raw) DEA input technical efficiency estimates.  These scores are calculated in the first step of 
our analysis before the application of the Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrapping procedure. 
Authors’ calculation 
EFFbc,i,j Bias-corrected DEA input technical efficiency estimates. These scores result from the application of the 
first bootstrap of the Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrapping procedure on the raw DEA 
estimates.  
Authors’ calculation 
Macroeconomic and financial conditions variables  
Infl An annual rate of inflation measured as the percentage change in the consumer price index. World Bank Indicators (WDI) 
Gdpg A measure of the economic conditions under which a bank operates.  It is defined as the real annual 
growth in GDP. 
World Bank Indicators (WDI) 
PrCrGDP A ratio of private sector credit to gross domestic product that measures the level of financial 
development. 
World Bank Indicators (WDI) 
Conc A measure of market concentration, which is calculated as the ratio of the assets of three largest banks to 
the assets of all publicly traded banks. 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
(2000), "A New Database on 
Financial Development and 
Structure," World Bank Economic 
Review 14, 597-605. (Dataset 
updated April 2013)  
Regulatory conditions variables  
Caprq Measures whether capital requirements reflect certain risk elements and deducts certain market value 
losses from capital adequacy. It is an index that is the normalized sum of the answers to the following 
questions (yes=1, no=0).  (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle 
guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary as a function of individual credit risk?  (3) Does the ratio vary with 
market risk? (4) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted 
from the book value of capital: (a) market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? (b) 
Unrealised losses in securities portfolios? (c) Unrealized foreign exchange losses?  It takes values 
between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicating greater capital stringency.  
(Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2012) 
 compj Measures the restriction on entry or the lack of competition using the following questions: (1) Limitation 
on foreign bank entry/ownership (0-3) lower value indicative of greater stringency; (2) Entry into 
banking requirements (0-8) higher value indicates greater stringency; (3) Percentage of entry 
applications denied.  An overall index is calculated by normalizing each question to take values between 
0 and 1 and taking an overall average.  Values closer to 1 indicate greater restrictions on 
competitiveness.  
(Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2012) 
prmonj Measures the degree to which banks are required to publicly disclose accurate information and whether 
incentives are in place to encourage private monitoring.  It is an index that is the normalized sum of the 
answers to the following questions. In questions 1–6: yes=1 and no=0 while the opposite occurs in the 
case of questions 7 and 8 (i.e. yes = 0, no = 1). (1) Is subordinated debt allowable (or required) as part of 
capital? (2) Are financial institutions required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and 
any nonbank financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to the public? (4) Must 
banks disclose their risk management procedures to public? (5) Are directors legally liable for 
erroneous/misleading information? (6) Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks? (7) 
Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income statement while the loan is 
nonperforming? (8) Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system?  It takes values between 0 
and 1, values closer to 1 indicate higher levels of private monitoring. 
(Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2012) 
depsecj This index is calculated as the average of three normalized variables.  Each variable is normalized to 
take values between zero and one. The variables are: 
 a) Deposit insurer power: based on the assignment of 1 (yes) or 0 (no) values to three questions 
assessing whether the deposit insurance authority has the authority: (1) to make the decision to intervene 
in a bank, (2) to take legal action against bank directors or officials, or (3) has ever taken any legal action 
against bank directors or officers. The sum of the assigned values ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values 
indicating more power. 
(b) Deposit insurance funds to total bank assets: the size of the deposit insurance fund relative to total 
bank assets. In the case of the U.S. savings and loan debacle during the 1980s, the insurance agency 
itself reported insolvency. This severely limited its ability to effectively resolve failed savings and loan 
institutions in a timely manner (Barth, 1991). 
(c) Moral hazard index: based on Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), who used principal 
components to capture the presence and design features of explicit deposit insurance systems, with the 
latter including: no coinsurance, foreign currency deposits covered, interbank deposits covered, type of 
funding, source of funding, management, membership, and the level of explicit coverage. Higher values 
imply greater moral hazard. 
Values closer to 1 indicate higher levels of depositor security. 
(Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2012) 
corpgovj A measure of corporate governance and quantifies the effectiveness of external audits of banks. It is the 
normalized sum of the answers to the following questions (Yes=1, No=0): 1.Is an external audit a 
compulsory obligation for banks? 2.Are specific requirements for the extent or nature of the audit spelled 
out? 3. Are auditors licensed or certified? 4. Do supervisors get a copy of the auditor's report? 5. Does 
the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the 
approval of the bank? 6. Are auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency 
any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider 
abuse? 7. Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? It takes values 
between 0 and 1.  Values closer to 1 indicate better strength of external audit. 
(Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2012) 
restrj This measures the extent to which a bank can participate in: (1) securities activities; (2) insurance (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2012) 
 activities;  (3) real estate activities; (4) bank ownership of nonfinancial firms ; (5) Nonfinancial firms 
owning banks; and (6) Nonbank financial firms owning banks. These activities can be; unrestricted=1: 
full range of activities can be conducted directly in the bank; permitted=2: full range of activities can be 
conducted but some must be done within subsidiaries; restricted=3: less than full range of activities can 
be conducted in the bank or subsidiaries; and prohibited=4: the activities cannot be conducted in the 
bank or subsidiaries.   Summing all values and normalizing the result to be between 0 and 1 creates an 
overall index. Values closer to 1 indicate greater restrictiveness. 
BCP compliance variables Twenty-five individual compliance rates based on each of 25 Core Principles are used in the 
constructions of the Chapter variables. Each rate is based on a four-point scale: noncompliant=0; 
materially noncompliant=1; largely compliant=3; and compliant=4. These 25 are categorized into 
seven chapters, which represent different regulatory dimensions of supervision. The seven variables 
below represent each of these chapters.   
IMF/World Bank Basel Core 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) database. 
BCPCh1 (Chapter 1) 
Preconditions for effective 
banking supervision 
Measures the extent to which the preconditions for effective banking supervision have been met  
This index is a normalized sum of the rates of compliance with sub-principles of principle 1: 1(1): There 
should be clear responsibilities and objectives set by legislation for each supervisory agency; 1(2): Each 
supervisory agency should possess adequate resources to meet the objective set, provided on terms that 
do not undermine the autonomy, integrity and independence of supervisory agency; 1(3): A suitable 
framework of banking laws, setting bank minimum standard, including provisions related to 
authorization of banking establishments and their supervision; 1(4): The legal framework should provide 
power to address compliance with laws as well as safety and soundness concerns; 1(5): The legal 
framework should provide protection of supervisors for actions taken in good faith in the course of 
performing supervisory duties; and 1(6): There should be arrangements of interagency cooperation, 
including with foreign supervisors, for sharing information and protecting the confidentiality of such 
information. This index takes values between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicative of better 
adherence to these preconditions. 
IMF/World Bank Basel Core 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) database. 
BCPCh2 (Chapter 2) 
Licensing and structure 
This index is a normalized sum of the compliance rates of principles 2-5; 2: Definition of permissible 
activities; 3: Right to set licensing criteria and reject applications for establishments that do not meet the 
standard sets; 4: Authority to review and reject proposals for significant ownership changes; and 5: 
Authority to establish criteria for reviewing major acquisitions or investments. This index takes values 
between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicative of greater power of supervisors to licence and 
influence structure. 
IMF/World Bank Basel Core 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) database. 
BCPCh3 (Chapter 3)  
Prudential regulation 
requirements 
Measures the prudence and appropriateness of the minimum capital adequacy requirements that 
supervisors set. This index is the normalized sum of the rates of compliance with principles 6–15: 6: 
Prudent and appropriate risk-adjusted capital adequacy ratios must be set; 7: Supervisors should evaluate 
banks’ credit policies; 8: Banks should adhere to adequate loan evaluation and loan-loss provisioning 
policies; 9: Supervisors should set limits to restrict large exposures, and concentration in bank portfolios 
should be identifiable; 10: Supervisors must have in place requirements to mitigate the risks associated 
with related lending; 11: Policies must be in place to identify, monitor, and control country risks, and to 
maintain reserves against such risks; 12: Systems must be in place to accurately measure, monitor, and 
adequately control markets risks, and supervisors should have powers to impose limits or capital charge 
on such exposures; 13: Banks must have in place a comprehensive risk management process to identify, 
measure, monitor, and control all other material risks and, if needed, hold capital against such risks; 14: 
Banks should have internal control and audit systems in place; and 15: Adequate policies, practices, and 
procedures should be in place to promote high ethical and professional standards and prevent the bank 
IMF/World Bank Basel Core 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) database. 
 being used by criminal elements. This index takes values between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 
indicating a greater compliance cost for banks of adherence to the minimum capital requirements. 
BCPCh4 (Chapter 4) 
Methods of ongoing supervision 
This measures the extent of the ongoing supervision. This index is calculated as the normalized sum of 
the rates of compliance rates with principles 16–20: 16: An effective supervisory system should consist 
of on-site and off-site supervision; 17: Supervisors should have regular contact with bank management; 
18: Supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing, and analyzing prudential reports and 
statistics returns from banks on a solo and consolidated basis; 19: Supervisors must have a means of 
independent validation of supervisory information, either through on-site examinations or use of external 
auditors; and 20: Supervisors must have the ability to supervise banking groups on a consolidated basis.  
This index takes values between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicative of higher levels of on-going 
supervision. 
IMF/World Bank Basel Core 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) database. 
BCPCh5 (Chapter 5) 
Information requirements 
A measure of the required extent of a bank’s internal financial records. This variable is the normalized 
compliance rate for principle 21: Each bank must maintain adequate records that enable the supervisor to 
obtain a true and fair view of the financial condition of the bank, and must publish on a regular basis 
financial statements that fairly reflect its condition.  This variable takes values between 0 and 1, with 
values closer to 1 indicative of the increased information requirements placed on banks by supervisors. 
IMF/World Bank Basel Core 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) database. 
BCPCh6 (Chapter 6) 
Formal Powers of supervisors 
A measure of the formal powers of supervisors, calculated as the normalized compliance rate of 
principle 22: Adequate supervisory measures must be in place to bring about corrective action when 
banks fail to meet prudential requirements when there are regulatory violations, or when depositors are 
threatened in any other way. This should include the ability to revoke the banking license or recommend 
its revocation.  This variable takes values between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicative of greater 
supervisory powers.  
 
IMF/World Bank Basel Core 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) database. 
BCPCh7 (Chapter 7) 
Cross-border banking 
Measures the extent to which supervisors apply global consolidated supervision over internationally 
active banks. This index is calculated as the normalized sum of the compliance rates of principles 23-25: 
23: Supervisors must practice global consolidated supervision over internationally active banks, 
adequately monitor, and apply prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by these banks; 
24: Consolidated supervision should include establishing contact and information exchange with the 
various supervisors involved, primarily host country supervisory authorities; 25: Supervisors must 
require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted at the same standards as required of 
domestic institutions, and must have powers to share information needed by the home country 
supervisors of those banks.  This index takes values between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicative 
of increased practice of global consolidated supervision. 
IMF/World Bank Basel Core 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) database. 
BCPScore An overall index, created by taking the mean value of all seven-chapter indices above.  This index takes 
values between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicative of increased overall compliance with the 
BCPs.  
IMF/World Bank Basel Core 
Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP) database. 
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